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Abstract Knowledge Representation (KR) originated
as a discipline within Artificial Intelligence, and is con-
cerned with the representation of knowledge in symbol-
ic form so that it can be stored and manipulated on a
computer. This article surveys that part of KR that is
concerned with the representation of space and time,
with particular reference to the use of such representa-
tions in geographical information science.
Keywords Knowledge representation · Spatial KR ·
Temporal KR
What is knowledge representation?
Knowledge Representation (KR) originated as a sub-
field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). In the early days
of AI, it was sometimes imagined that to endow a
computer with intelligence it would be sufficient to
give it a capacity for pure reasoning; it quickly became
apparent, however, that the exercise of intelligence
inevitably involves interaction with an external world,
and such interaction cannot take place without some
kind of knowledge of that world. Thus it became clear
that part of the quest for AI must involve the devel-
opment of methods for endowing computer systems
with knowledge. This in turn brought to the fore the
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question of how such knowledge is to be represented
within the computer. This question can be approached
in many different ways, but one can broadly distin-
guish between approaches which seek to discover, and
thereby emulate, the forms in which knowledge is rep-
resented in the human brain, and those which take
their inspiration from the external forms of represen-
tation used by humans to encode their knowledge,
notably language, mathematics, and formal logic. The
term Knowledge Representation, when used in the AI
context, is generally taken to refer to approaches of the
latter kind rather than the former, which are regarded
as more within the province of Cognitive Science. We
thus find that KR is characterised in the literature in
terms that emphasise the quest for explicit symbolic
representations of knowledge that are suitable for use
by computers:
Knowledge representation and reasoning is the
area of Artificial Intelligence (AI) concerned with
how knowledge can be represented symbolically
and manipulated in an automated way by reason-
ing programs. (Brachman and Levesque 2004)
. . . knowledge representation (the study of how to
put knowledge into a form that a computer can
reason with) . . . (Russell and Norvig 2003)
Any intelligent declarative system will need to
know an awful lot about the environment in which
it is situated; knowledge representation research
studies the problem of finding a language in which
to encode that knowledge so that the machine can
use it. (Ginsberg 1993)
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Knowledge Representation is no longer, however, ex-
clusively the preserve of AI, as witness the following
remark by Sowa:
[T]oday, advanced systems everywhere are per-
forming tasks that used to require human intel-
ligence . . . As a result, the AI design techniques
have converged with techniques from other fields,
especially database and object-oriented systems.
(Sowa 2000)
In particular, Knowledge Representation is closely al-
lied with Formal Ontology, which is concerned with the
systematic enumeration and classification of the various
kinds of entity represented within a given conceptuali-
sation of the world, together with an account of their
properties and relationships. Having started life as a
discipline within Philosophy, Formal Ontology has be-
come an important strand within information systems
research (Guarino 1998; Smith 2004), with particular
application to the problems of maintaining coherence
and consistency when combining large bodies of knowl-
edge from different sources, as happens ever more
frequently with the expansion of the World Wide Web
(Colomb 2007).
In this article I shall be particularly concerned with
the use of KR techniques in encoding the spatial and
temporal aspects of knowledge, as these aspects are
fundamental to the use and development of spatial
information systems in geography and the Earth sci-
ences. Before turning to a review of these techniques,
however, a few more general remarks are in order.
It should be emphasised that the term ‘knowledge’
implies much more than just facts, information, or data.
These things can only constitute knowledge to the ex-
tent that they are situated in a context provided by
some general understanding of the aspects of the world
which they pertain to. To give a very simple example,
a child might be able to give the correct answers to
questions such as ‘What is the capital of France?’ and
‘What country is Paris in?’, and to that extent may be
said to be in possession of certain facts. But does the
child know that Paris is the capital of France? Suppose,
on questioning, he proved to have no understanding
of, for example, the difference between a country and
a city, or the role played in the life of a country by
its capital. In that case we might dismiss his supposed
‘knowledge’ as nothing more than parroting. Even so, it
is not totally without value: imagine two children, one
with a very good understanding of geography, politics,
economics, etc, but a very poor memory for specific
facts such as which city is the capital of which country;
and another, like an idiot savant, who has an ency-
clopaedic command of all those specific facts, but is
totally lacking in any such understanding. Together,
they could make a very good team, although it would
no doubt be most satisfactory for the two sets of skills
to be combined in one person. Currently, computer
systems resemble the second child much more than
they do the first, and the whole enterprise of KR may
be seen as the quest to endow them with something
of the capacities of the first child. Representation of
knowledge thus involves representing understanding
too, typically in the form of some general model within
which the facts can be represented and brought into
relation with one another. Knowledge Representation
as a discipline is thus more concerned with formulating
such models than with the collection of individual items
of knowledge, although the ultimate purpose of such
models is, of course, to support that knowledge.
In the nature of the enterprise, KR as it has been
practised in AI has developed strong affinities with
disciplines such as philosophy and linguistics, where
the nature of what exists, what we can know about it,
and how that knowledge is represented are of key im-
portance. These relationships are sometimes regarded
as surprising by those whose expectations are that a
computer-based subject should be more naturally al-
lied with engineering and the natural sciences. In fact,
during its short history, AI has proved receptive to
influences from a wide range of disciplines, includ-
ing mathematics, linguistics, philosophy, psychology,
physics, and engineering, and AI researchers include
amongst their ranks practitioners qualified in all these
disciplines. This is also true, to some extent, of KR
as a subfield of AI, but here it must be admitted that
within KR there has historically been a strong emphasis
(some would say bias) on the use of techniques based
on formal logic.1 In this article I shall not make any
use of formal logic notations, but it should be empha-
sised that much of the KR literature is inaccessible to
readers without at least a nodding acquaintance with
the concepts and notations of first-order logic. A good
introduction for the general reader is Hodges (2001).
The use of formal logic as a basic language for knowl-
edge representation is motivated by the consideration
that one of the main purposes for representing knowl-
edge in AI is to enable reasoning about it, and logic,
as the science of inference and deduction, is a natural
tool to use for this. Reasoning in logic can take various
1Not that this has been without controversy, with criticisms
directed both at a perceived over-reliance on formal logical
techniques (McDermott 1987) and at the underlying philosophy
of representationalism (the assumption that internal representa-
tions of the world are a prerequisite for intelligent behaviour)
(Brooks 1991).
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forms, notably deduction (i.e., deriving logically valid
consequences for some collection of initial statements
presented as premises) and consistency checking (i.e.,
determining whether or not some set of statements can
all be simultaneously true). These two processes are
intimately related in that the inference of conclusion C
from some list of premises P1, P2, . . . , Pn will be valid
if, and only if, the statements P1, P2, . . . , Pn, not-C are
inconsistent.2 Widely used formal techniques include
Natural Deduction, Semantic Tableaux, and various
forms of Resolution, which are particularly suitable for
automated deduction and form the basis for the logic-
programming language Prolog (Bratko 2009).
Such methods provide basic tools for determining
the validity of inferences or the consistency of knowl-
edge bases, but because they are extremely general
they are often unsuited, as they stand, to the practi-
cal requirements of specific knowledge representation
problems. In the development of expert systems, for
example, various more specific forms of reasoning have
been employed, notably: rule-based methods, in which
knowledge is encoded in the form of ‘if . . . then . . . ’
rules which can be used to establish conclusions, either
in a goal-driven way (backward chaining) or a data-
driven way (forward-chaining); model-based reasoning,
which seeks to go beyond mere rules by encoding an
understanding of the domain in the form of explicit
structural models; and case-based reasoning, which uses
an explicit corpus of known solutions on which to base
solutions to new, but related problems. In addition,
there are hybrid systems which may combine features
of all of these. For more details on such methods, see
Luger (2002). Although reasoning is clearly an impor-
tant aspect of knowledge representation (indeed the
major conference series in this area, generally abbre-
viated KR, has the full title ‘Principles of Knowledge
Representation and Reasoning’), the main emphasis in
this survey will be on questions of representation as
being both more immediately accessible to the novice
and in a certain sense more fundamental.
Another emphasis of KR has been on what is known
as ‘commonsense knowledge’; this is the kind of knowl-
edge that we humans routinely deploy in our day-
do-day existence when we are not engaged in tasks
that require technical knowledge and skills that have
been acquired through specialist training (Hobbs and
Moore 1985). Thus, for example, the knowledge of the
physical world that is required is not what is presented
2Note for the initiated: Strictly, if they are unsatisfiable. The text
tacitly assumes we are working in a sound and complete logic, for
which consistency and satisfiability coincide.
within the academic discipline of physics, but rather the
‘naïve physics’ that is shared by all humans by virtue
of their intuitive understanding of how physical objects
behave under the ordinary circumstances encountered
in everyday life—for example, the knowledge that un-
supported objects fall towards the ground, that unpow-
ered moving objects normally come to rest eventually,
that solid objects cannot occupy overlapping locations
simultaneously, that liquids can be poured, and so on
(Hayes 1979, 1985; Davis 2008).
In keeping with this emphasis on common sense
rather than specialist or technical understanding, it has
been the view of many practitioners of KR that this
commonsense understanding is largely qualitative in
nature. With reference to time and space, this has the
implications that the standard mathematical models
that have been of such great service in the natural
sciences may be less appropriate for the purposes of
emulating the spatial and temporal aspects of common-
sense knowledge, and this in turn has sometimes led
to conflict or misunderstanding (cf. Shoham 1988; Naur
1989).
Some aspects of everyday knowledge that have
been found to be particularly problematic—and
which have therefore engaged what might be thought
to be a disproportionate amount of the attention of
KR researchers—include vagueness, uncertainty, and
granularity.
The problem of vagueness (or indeterminacy
Burrough and Frank 1996) is that whereas much
of ordinary language is imprecise in various ways,
the symbolic systems devised for representing in a
computer the knowledge encoded in such language are
by nature precise. An example of this that has been
much studied in the context of GIScience concerns the
application of place names to geographical regions.
Many place-names seem to be somewhat indeter-
minate in their spatial reference. For example, terms
such as ‘Central London’ or ‘the west of England’,
which are often used in everyday life, do not correspond
to any precisely delineated geographical regions,
since it is in some measure indeterminate just which
locations they cover; yet most geographical information
systems and spatial databases are only able to assign a
precisely determined spatial region as the referent of
such a name. This problem has been studied in relation
to such examples as forests (Bennett 2001b), moun-
tains (Fisher et al. 2004; Smith and Mark 2003), and
town centres (Montello et al. 2003), and various
technical solutions have been proposed for how to
represent vagueness formally, e.g., using fuzzy set
theory (Wang and Hall 1996), ‘egg-yolk’ theory
(Lehmann and Cohn 1994; Cohn and Gotts 1996a, b),
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rough sets (Bittner and Stell 2001; Vögele et al. 2003;
Worboys 1998), supervaluation semantics (Bennett
2001a; Kulik 2000; Kulik 2001; Bittner and Smith
2003), and anchoring (Galton and Hood 2005; Hood
and Galton 2006).
Uncertainty is different from vagueness in that
whereas the latter involves the intrinsic indeterminacy
of certain terms, the former is concerned with the
limitations in our knowledge. The location of Central
London is vague rather than uncertain, because there
simply is no fact of the matter as to where the bound-
aries of Central London are—it is not as if we could
discover these by unearthing new facts. On the other
hand, the location of Archimedes’ tomb is uncertain,
not vague: it must have had a precisely definable loca-
tion, but we do not know for sure exactly where it was.
Approaches to uncertainty include probabilistic meth-
ods (Pearl 1988) and various forms of non-monotonic
reasoning (Antoniou 1997).
Granularity is different again, and concerns the level
of detail with which information is recorded. Most
obviously, this could be a matter of resolution: e.g.,
a map which records the presence or absence of a
particular species of plant in each 2 km square has
a finer granularity than one which is based on 10km
squares. Similarly, a road map which only shows the
main trunk roads has a coarser granularity than one
which shows all the minor roads in addition. And a
map of the USA showing the state boundaries only
has a coarser granularity than one which also shows
the county boundaries. This is not just a matter of
scale; in general the larger the scale of a map, the
finer its granularity is likely to be, but this correlation
is not exact. An approach to a formal treatment of
granularity in AI is proposed by Hobbs (1985). Gran-
ularity affects both time (Euzenat and Montanari 2005)
and space (Schmidtke and Woo 2007) and the two
in combination (Bittner 2002; Stell 2003). Granularity-
related problems arise in a specific form in cartography
in relation to map generalisation, that is, the task of re-
ducing the level of detail in a map while preserving the
correct relationships amongst the features that remain
(João 1998).
Temporal knowledge representation
The standard conception of time in the natural sciences
is determined by the way in which times are speci-
fied and measured. Measurement of time means the
measurement of the temporal duration of an event or
interval; specification means locating an event within
the historical time series. To some extent these can be
accomplished independently, but in practice the latter
is dependent on the former. The duration of a temporal
interval is reckoned by counting the repetitions of some
standard cyclical process and its subdivisions; the result
is expressed as a real (in practice always rational!)
number of units. The choice of unit employed (years,
days, seconds, milliseconds, etc) depends on the context
of the measurement, but it is usual to regard the second
as the basic unit of time in terms of which other units
may be defined. Locating an event in the time series
means in the first instance locating it relative to other
events. This can be done in a purely qualitative fashion,
by noting e.g., that event E1 occurred after event E0
and before E2, for some suitable choice of reference
events E0 and E2; and this can be made quantitative
by specifying further the duration of one or both of the
intervals between E0 and E1 and between E1 and E2.
In order to arrive at an ‘absolute’ system of temporal
location, one must agree on a standard reference event
relative to which all other events can be located. In
the Christian calendar used in most western societies,
the reference event is the notional time of Christ’s
birth (in reality a matter of considerable uncertainty).
In cosmological contexts, events may be referred to
the time of the Big Bang (also uncertain); in geology
and archaeology, it is common to refer dates to the
present (“B.P.”); the obvious disadvantage of this—
that the date of an event changes continuously—is
negated when considering events for which the un-
certainty in their temporal location exceeds the time
scale within which the B.P. dating system is in use.
Abstracting from these considerations, we can say time
is modelled as a linear series of instants isomorphic
to some portion of the real number line as regards
both its metric and ordering properties. An advantage
of this is that it enables time to be handled math-
ematically in well-known and well-established ways;
and to some extent this fits in with our everyday
use of clocks and calendars as providing precise—or
precise enough—numerical indices of time.
None the less, it might be argued that our most basic
notions of temporality are essentially qualitative: that
the idea that one event preceded another is conceptu-
ally more fundamental than the idea that the temporal
separation of the events is a certain number of hours,
say. If one takes the real number line as a model for
the time line, with each number corresponding to an
instant, then in addition to the quantitative precision
afforded by the use of the real numbers, the model
makes some strong presuppositions about the qualita-
tive nature of the temporal ordering, which may be ex-
pressed in terms of a ‘precedence’ relation taken as the
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primitive basis for the ordering. These presuppositions
are as follows:
1. Irreflexivity: No instant precedes itself.
2. Transitivity: If t precedes t′, which in turn precedes
t′′, then t also precedes t′′.
3. Linearity: Of any two distinct instants, one precedes
the other.
4. Past unboundedness: For every instant, there is an
instant which precedes it.
5. Future unboundedness: For every instant, there is
an instant which it precedes.
6. Density: Between any two distinct instants there is
a third instant which precedes one and is preceded
by the other.
7. Continuity: If a set S of instants is such that (a) no
instant in S is preceded by an instant not in S, and
(b) there is at least one instant not in S, then either
(c) there is a last instant in S or (d) there is a first
instant not in S.
The continuity condition expresses the Dedekind prop-
erty of the real numbers, which distinguishes their order
type from that of the rational numbers, which also pos-
sess the first six properties above. In logical terms, it is
notable that the first six properties can be expressed in
first-order logic, whereas the seventh property cannot.3
Moreover, these six first-order properties are complete
in the sense that any first-order-expressible property of
the ordering on the real numbers necessarily follows, by
pure logic, from the six given properties; as such, the six
properties can be taken as providing an axiomatisation
of the first-order logic of the qualitative ordering of
real-valued time (Van Benthem 1983), and hence a
suitable basis for qualitative reasoning.
For the purpose of qualitative temporal reasoning
over particular domains, one may wish to omit or re-
place one or more of the axioms. For example, the
density axiom might be replaced by the following
6′. Discreteness: If an instant has a predecessor
(successor), then it has an immediate predecessor
(successor),
where a predecessor is an instant which precedes the
given instant, an immediate predecessor is a latest pre-
decessor, i.e., a predecessor of the given instant which
is preceded by all the other predecessors of that instant;
and similarly for successor, with ‘precedes’ replaced
by ‘follows’ (the inverse of ‘precedes’). The axioms 1–
5 and 6′ characterise the first-order properties of the
ordering of the integers, but again not exhaustively—to
3It requires second-order logic to express it.
capture the integers uniquely one again needs to sup-
plement these axioms with a property not expressible
in first-order logic (e.g., that between any two instants
there are at most finitely many others).
Discrete (integer-like) time can be a useful model for
situations where the system under study evolves in a
sequence of discrete steps, as for example the execution
of a computer program, or the moves in a board game.
If one is studying a phenomenon that only displays
significant structure on a time-scale of more than a day,
say, then it is reasonable to use a discrete sequence
of days as an idealised representation of time for the
purposes of modelling that phenomenon, and if one
does this then the implicit logic is that of axioms 1–5,
6′ rather 1–6.
Another interesting possibility is to drop the lin-
earity axiom (3). By doing so, one can build into the
temporal model an asymmetry between the past and
the future by which, at any point of time, there is a
unique past but many possible futures. The possibility
here may represent genuine indeterminacy, or simply
uncertainty, so one can adopt this model without having
to commit oneself to any particular philosophical stance
on determinism and free will. This ‘branching time’
model can be obtained by replacing axiom 3 by
3′. Past-linearity: Of any two distinct instants which
both precede some third instant, one precedes the
other.
In Fig. 1 is shown a simple branching-time model. Here
any two instants which both precede the time labelled t
must lie along the line of times stretching into the past
from t; these form a linear series, and hence one of the
instants must precede the other, as required by axiom
t
t*
Fig. 1 A simple branching-time model
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3′. But of the distinct times t and t∗, which do not both
precede some common third time, neither precedes the
other.
Thus far, time is modelled as a set of instants with
some kind of ordering relation. Within AI knowledge
representation, it was soon noticed that for many pur-
poses we are more interested in intervals than instants.
It is the difference between a clock and a calendar:
where the clock provides us with an endless supply of
time instants (e.g., 4.26 p.m., on the stroke of midnight),
a calendar supplies us with intervals: days, weeks,
months, and years. Moreover, if we are talking about
an event or a state of affairs in the world, and ask when
the event happened or the state of affairs obtained, the
answer is almost always an interval: e.g., John travelled
to London on August 26th; Mary was in the house from
2 pm to 3.45 p.m.
An early, and highly influential, interval-based the-
ory of time was that of James Allen (Allen 1984; Allen
and Hayes 1985). Allen showed that the qualitative re-
lationships amongst time intervals can all be expressed
in terms of a single primitive relation ‘meets’, where
‘i1 meets i2’ means that the interval i1 ends exactly
when i2 begins. The systematic treatment of inter-
vals, and the 13 distinct qualitative relations between
them, has become known as the Interval Calculus. The
relations are:
< is before > is after
m meets mi is met by
o overlaps oi is overlapped by
s starts si is started by
f finishes f i is finished by
d is during di contains
= equals
It will be seen that the relations come in pairs which
are mutually inverse (e.g., if i1 meets i2 then i2 is met by
i1). The ‘equals’ relation is unpaired since it is its own
inverse. This system of 13 relations is said to be JEPD,
meaning ‘Jointly Exhaustive and Pairwise Disjoint’—
meaning that, for any two intervals, exactly one of the
relations must hold.
Freksa (1992a) neatly characterised the 13 relations
of the Interval Calculus in terms of relations between
the endpoints of the intervals concerned. Figure 2,
adapted from Freksa’s paper, illustrates this; here α and
A are the beginnings of the two intervals, and ω and 
are the corresponding endings. Clearly we must have
α < ω and A < ; the 13 interval relations correspond
to the possible ways of consistently assigning a rela-
tive ordering to each of remaining pairs (α, A), (α,),


























Fig. 2 The Interval Calculus relations derived from the relative
ordering of the endpoints (after Freksa 1992a)
Freksa introduced the concept of conceptual neigh-
bourhood, which he defined as follows:4
Definition 1 (Freksa 1992a, b): Two relations between
pairs of events are (conceptual) neighbours, if they can
be directly transformed into one another by continu-
ously deforming (i.e., shortening, lengthening, moving)
the events (in a topological sense).
Thus, for example, the relation o is a conceptual neigh-
bour of s since if i1 overlaps i2, then by delaying the
beginning of i1 until it coincides with the beginning of
i2, it then holds that i1 starts i2. This can be read off from
Fig. 2 from the fact that the relations o and s occupy
neighbouring cells in the diagram. Freksa distinguished
three different neighbourhood relations corresponding
to different allowed deformations, and conjectured that
‘if a cognitive system is uncertain as to which relation
between two events holds, uncertainty can be expected
particularly between neighboring concepts’.
The Interval Calculus is governed by a compre-
hensive set of composition rules, of which a typical
example is:
If i1 overlaps i2 and i2 overlaps i3 then i1 either
is before, meets, or overlaps i3.
4Note that Freksa here refers to events rather than intervals; this
fully accords with Allen’s declaration that intervals are of interest
only insofar as they are the times at which events occur.
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This is illustrated in Fig. 3, where each of the three
possibilities for the relationship between i1 and i3 is
illustrated. It should be noted that before, meets, and
overlaps form a connected set ({<,m,o}) under con-
ceptual neighbourhood—and indeed all the entries in
the composition table have this property, corroborating
Freksa’s conjecture.
The complete set of composition rules is presented
in a table (variously known as a ‘transitivity table’
or a ‘composition table’). The idea is that a reasoner
equipped with this table and an appropriate algorithm
for deductive reasoning (e.g., using constraint propaga-
tion) is able to make inferences such as the following:
Given that the time of the earthquake overlaps the time
of the landslide, and the time of the landslide overlaps
the collapse of the dam, it follows that the time of the
earthquake overlaps, meets, or precedes the collapse of
the dam.
Unfortunately, this kind of reasoning is rather lim-
ited, because many of the entries of the composition
table contain too many alternative possibilities. The
example in Fig. 3 has three; but if all we know is that
i1 precedes i2 and i2 follows i3, then the relationship
between i1 and i3 could be any of the 13 interval calculus
relations. In such a case we require information which
goes beyond the purely qualitative, e.g., about the du-
ration of the intervals, or the extent of their overlap.
More generally, for the purposes of reasoning, we
need to consider not just the JEPD set of ‘base’ rela-
tions listed above, but also disjunctions of these. For
example, if all we know about two intervals is that i
starts before j, then the relation between them could be
any of <, m, o, fi, and di (as can be read off from Fig. 2,
expressing the constraint as α < A), and hence may
be represented as a disjunctive relation which we may
denote {<,m,o,fi,di}. The total number of such relations
is 213 = 8192, and these constitute the full interval alge-
bra, often denotedA. The composition table forA thus
has 81922 = 67, 108, 864 entries—these do not need to
be computed individually, however, as any individual
entry is readily derived from the composition table for
the base relations.
There is a considerable body of research into the
mathematical and computational properties of the In-
terval Calculus and related systems. Here we shall
merely give the briefest indication of the main results
of this research. Of particular interest, as regards the
applicability of any of these formalisms, is whether or
not it is decidable, and if so, what is the computational
complexity of its decision problem. A formalism is de-
cidable if there is an algorithm, specifiable in advance,
which will determine, for any collection of statements
in the theory, whether or not they have a model, that
is an actual example of a situation which is correctly
described by those statements.
The most basic problem for reasoning over A is
the constraint satisfiability problem. An instance of this
problem consists of a set of constraints of the form ‘i
stands in relation R to j’, where ‘i’ and ‘ j’ are variables
standing for intervals and ‘R’ is any one of the 8192
relations inA. Given such a set, the problem is to deter-
mine whether it is possible to associate actual intervals
(represented using real-number pairs, e.g., (1.5,2.7))
with the variables appearing in the set in such a way
as to satisfy all the constraints. As a simple illustration,
consider the following set of constraints:
i1 {m, o} i2
i2 {f,=, fi} i3
i3 mi i4
i4 < i1
It is easy enough, in this case, to find an allocation
of intervals to the variables so that these constraints
are satisfied, e.g., i1 = (3, 4), i2 = (4, 5), i3 = (2, 5), i4 =
(1, 2). Equally, if the third constraint is replaced by
i3 m i4, it is easy to see that there is no such allocation. A
general solution of the constraint satisfiability problem
for A would be an algorithm which will correctly deter-
mine for an arbitrary set of constraints whether or not
it is satisfiable.
An approach which provides partial solutions to this
makes use of the idea of path-consistency. Suppose
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we have a set of interval variables, say i1, i2, . . . , in,
together with constraints (i.e., A relations) for at least
some pairs of intervals—a pair of intervals for which no
explicit constraint is given will be allocated the ‘non-
constraint’ consisting of all 13 Allen relations. Such a
system of relations is said to be path-consistent so long
as every solution for any two variables can be extended
to a solution for those two variables together any other
variable. For A (though not in general), this property
is equivalent to algebraic closure (Ligozat and Renz
2004), which means that for any three intervals i, j, k, if
theA relation assigned to i and j is R1 and that assigned
to j and k is R2, then the relation assigned to i and k is
contained in the composition of R1 and R2 as given in
the composition table. Given such a set of constraints,
one seeks to enforce path-consistency by systematically
removing from the stated constraints any that conflict
with the algebraic closure criterion, and iterating this
process until either the relation assigned to some pair of
intervals becomes empty, or no further changes to the
relations occur. In the former case, we can infer that
the original set of constraints cannot be satisfied, and
we are finished. In the latter case, however, although
the constraints have now been made path-consistent,
we are still not guaranteed the existence of a model,
since unfortunately path-consistency turns out not to
be equivalent to satisfiability. The upshot of this is that
in order to solve the constraint satisfiability problem
in cases where path-consistency is established, further
work needs to be done.
How much more work is needed? The path-
consistency algorithm of van Beek (1992) runs in cubic
time—that is, the number of computational steps re-
quired is approximately proportional to the cube of the
number of variables in the instance being tested—and
is therefore tractable. Vilain and Kautz (1986) showed
that the constraint satisfiability problem for A is NP-
complete. No tractable algorithms for NP-complete
problems are currently known, and it is widely believed
that none can exist; if this proves to be correct,5 then
the amount of computational effort needed to resolve
the hardest cases of the problem will always increase
as an exponential function of the number of intervals.
For this reason, it is important to identify restrictions
to the general decision problem for A which make it
tractable. A number of researchers have investigated
restrictions taking the form of subalgebras of A, that is,
subsets of the full set of interval algebra relations that
are closed under the operations of intersection, con-
5That is, P =NP. See Garey and Johnson (1979) for details on NP-
completeness and the ‘P=NP’ problem
verse, and composition. A number of maximal tractable
subalgebras were identified (Nebel and Bürckert 1995;
Drakengren and Jonsson 1998), culminating in an ex-
haustive enumeration of the tractable subalgebras of A
by Krokhin et al. (2003).
It is generally agreed nowadays that a model of time
based on intervals alone is not wholly satisfactory: it
seems that we will always want to talk about both
intervals and instants. See Galton (1990) for an early
critique of the Interval Calculus in this respect.
In almost any application context, we are not so
much interested in time itself as in what goes on in
time. Modelling time itself is of importance only insofar
as it facilitates representing and reasoning about all
the states, processes, and events which take place in
time. An important strand in knowledge representation
has therefore been concerned with establishing an ap-
propriate formalism for handling states, processes, and
events, and how they are related to each other and
to the times at which they occur. Such matters have
also been of concern in Philosophy and Linguistics,
particularly in relation to the various forms of linguistic
expression used for talking about states, processes and
events, in particular the classification of different kinds
of verb whose behaviour reflects the underlying logic of
these categories.
The three categories of state, process, and event can
be roughly characterised as follows:
• We are dealing with a state when we abstract away
from any changes that might be taking place and
focus on the unchanging aspects of any situation.
For example, we might distinguish various states
of a river: normal flow, in full spate, or reduced
to a trickle. In all these states there is, of course,
change happening, since the water is flowing, but
in focusing on the state we are thinking about the
constant properties of the flow rather than the fact
that it involves many samples of water undergoing
changes in position. We may say that a state holds
or obtains at a particular moment or throughout a
particular interval, e.g., the river was reduced to a
trickle for the whole of August—and therefore in
particular it was in this state at midday on August
11th which was, say, when a certain observation was
made.
• In the case of a process we are concerned with
change, considered as something ongoing, i.e., as
it proceeds from moment to moment, rather than
as a completed whole. Thus the flow of the river
can be regarded as a process, involving as it does
the continuous and systematic movement of water
downstream. It is ongoing in the sense that we are
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not thinking in terms of something that begins and
then ends but rather with something that continues
throughout the period of interest; it is present at
each moment during that period, and may change
its character from one moment to the next, e.g., it
may become faster or more turbulent, or, indeed,
dwindle to a trickle. We do not say that a process
holds or obtains but that it goes on, proceeds, or is
in operation; and we can say that it is in operation
throughout some interval or at any particular mo-
ment of that interval.
• An event also involves change, but now considered
as a completed individual whole from beginning to
end, e.g., a particular episode of flooding starting
from when the river first overflows its banks and
ending when all the floodwater has drained away.
Events may last a very short time (e.g., a flash of
lightning) or a very long time (e.g., the extinction
of the dinosaurs); but in either case there is an
interval, correspondingly short or long, over which
we say that the event happens or occurs. More nor-
mally, in fact, we do not pinpoint the exact interval
of its occurrence but locate it within some wider
interval, as when we say that the thunderstorm oc-
curred during the afternoon without implying that
it lasted the whole afternoon.
Although these three categories are conceptually
quite distinct, there are important and far-reaching
relationships amongst them. Focussing in particular on
processes and events, we may note that there is a mu-
tual interdependence between them. Many processes
are as it were “made of” events, and conversely many
events are “made of” processes. To illustrate, consider
the phenomena of coastal erosion. We may say that
a particular stretch of coastal cliffs have been being
eroded over many centuries, and here we are clearly
referring to a process which may persist in a more
or less steady fashion over a long period. Looked at
more closely, however, we see that this process involves
a succession of individual cliff falls, each of which is
clearly an event, a bounded episode with a definite
location in time. An individual cliff fall involves a mass
of rock and earth sliding or tumbling down to the beach
below, and this sliding or tumbling may be regarded
as a process which is in operation for the duration of
the fall.
Speaking in general terms, we may say that if a
particular process comes into operation at a certain
time t1 and remains in operation until a later time t2,
at which it ceases, then we have here an occurrence
of an event on the interval [t1, t2], and we could say
that the event is “made of” the process. The event
and the process are not the same thing, however; for
example, the event occurred over the interval [t1, t2] but
it would not be correct to say that it occurred over any
proper subinterval of that interval—instead, we would
say that the first half of the event occurred over the first
half of the interval, and so on. On the other hand, the
process was in operation over each subinterval of [t1, t2]
and indeed at each instant within it. If now we have a
situation in which some event type is repeated many
times over a period, we can regard this repetition as
constituting an ongoing process which in principle may
be continued indefinitely; thus here we have a process
which is “made of” events. A simple example is the
process of raining, which consists of many individual
events each of which is the falling of a single drop. Each
such falling happens at a particular time, but the raining
process is in operation over a period which spans all
those particular times; whether we see the process or
many individual events is essentially a matter of the
granularity of the view we are taking. Thus we see that
processes and events stand in a different relation to the
times at which they are located, and this has important
implications for any systematic logical treatment of
them.
Although the account just given may seem straight-
forward enough, it would be a mistake to give the im-
pression that there is a consensus within the concerned
academic communities as to how states, processes,
events and the like should be handled, and indeed
one finds a wide variety of different proposals in the
literature (see Galton (2007) for a brief survey of such
proposals in linguistics, philosophy, and AI). When
reading the GIScience literature, one can find varied
(and sometimes idiosyncratic) usage conventions re-
garding the key terms ‘state’, ‘process’, and ‘event’, but
it is always a good policy here to adopt the ‘principle
of charity’ (Wilson 1959) and seek to understand an
author’s usage on the assumption that what they are
saying is sensible.
As noted above, there are constitution relationships
running both ways between processes and events: a
process can often be seen as composed of events, and
equally, an event can often be seen as composed of
processes. Which of these relationships you see can
depend on granularity, context, and the particular focus
of your interest. For example, Yuan (2001) focuses on
the latter aspect, defining an event as a ‘spatial and
temporal aggregate of its associated processes’. This
makes sense in the context of the application area
under discussion—the analysis of precipitation data—
where the events of interest are individual storms or
showers which can be further analysed into processes
representing the evolving sequence of precipitation
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states at different places and times within the storm.
The fact that the precipitation process consists of myr-
iad individual raindrop falling events lies at a level of
granularity far too fine to be considered in this analysis;
and the long-term pattern of storm events may consti-
tute a process when viewed at a coarse granularity, but
this view likewise would seem to lie outside the purview
of Yuan’s study.
Spatial knowledge representation
Within KR, it is noteworthy that, for the most part, the
treatment of space has lagged behind the treatment of
time by approximately a decade. A number of reasons
for this may be advanced, but two in particular seem
paramount. First, because space has three dimensions,
whereas time has only one, it affords a far greater
variety of possible structures which a representational
system has to handle. One has only to think here of the
concept of shape, which is of importance in many spa-
tial reasoning contexts; the variety of possible shapes
in two dimensions, let alone three, already presents
a formidable array of problems to anyone seeking to
systematise in a tractable way the processes of repre-
senting and reasoning with spatial knowledge. In time,
by contrast, the analogous concept to shape (of an
interval or event) is virtually empty. The second reason
for the delayed development of spatial KR has a rather
specific origin in the ‘poverty conjecture’ of Forbus
et al. (1987), that ‘there is no problem-independent,
purely qualitative representation of space or shape’
(Forbus 1995). Forbus adduces this as an explanation
for the fact that we humans are so reliant on diagrams
and other perceptual representations for our spatial
reasoning, since these can capture metric properties
absent from a purely qualitative representation, and
it is clear that many spatial reasoning tasks cannot
be accomplished without access to at least some met-
ric information. But Forbus does not on that account
dismiss qualitative spatial representations as useless:
on the contrary, he proposes (in the MD/PV—that is,
‘metric diagram’ plus ‘place vocabulary’—framework
of Forbus et al. (1987)) a marriage of qualitative
and quantitative representation that perhaps better re-
flects at least some of our human spatial reasoning
practices.
That the poverty conjecture was advanced for space
but not for time reflects the dimensionality difference
already alluded to. Apart from the difference in dimen-
sionality, a second key difference between time and
space is that time, unlike space, has an intrinsic direct-
edness, which we perceive as the asymmetry between
the past and the future. Time flows, we say, and always
in the same direction; there is no ‘going backwards’
in time (whatever that could mean), whereas in space
movement is possible in any direction.
Despite these two major differences between space
and time, there are many formal analogies between the
structures they present. Some examples are:
instant — point
interval — region
endpoints of interval — boundary of region
event occurs in interval — object located in region
process goes on during — stuff fills region
interval
as well as common relations such as overlap, adja-
cency and containment, and common problems such
as discrete vs continuous (Galton 1999), vagueness and
indeterminacy, granularity (Euzenat 1995).
All this should suggest the possibility of a formal
treatment of space and spatial relations that is analo-
gous to the treatments of time exemplified by the Inter-
val Calculus. Within AI, the breakthrough occurred in
a landmark paper by Randell et al. (1992) which intro-
duced an exhaustive set of qualitative spatial relations
that is analogous to the thirteen temporal relations of
the Interval Calculus; this system has come to be known
as the Region Connection Calculus (RCC) and has
been the subject of intensive research for over a decade.
At the same time, within the Geographical Information
Science community, Egenhofer and collaborators were
independently pursuing work (Egenhofer 1989, 1991;
Egenhofer and Franzosa 1991) that exhibits some re-
markable parallels with the RCC work, despite a num-
ber of significant differences. Egenhofer’s work is the
more familiar of the two within the GIScience commu-
nity, but because RCC exhibits greater continuity with
the temporal work discussed in the preceding section,
we shall discuss this first.
The key notions of RCC, as suggested by the title,
are region and connection. A region is an extended
portion of space; the notion can be applied in any
number of dimensions, the only caveats being that
regions must have the same dimensionality as the space
in which they are regarded as being embedded,6 (e.g.,
two-dimensional regions on the surface of the earth,
three-dimensional regions in the interior of the earth),
and that all the regions under consideration should
have the same dimensionality—thus RCC, at least in
its original form, cannot speak of the relation between,
6In other words, the regions should have co-dimension zero.
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say, the water in a lake (occupying a three-dimensional
region) and a stretch of the lake shore (occupying a
one-dimensional region).
Connection is to be understood as a relation between
regions, taken as a primitive in the logical theory;
there are a number of different ways in which it can
be interpreted (Cohn and Varzi 1998, 1999), but the
essential idea is that two regions are to be regarded
as connected7 so long as they are not separated—for
example, they may touch, overlap, or coincide, or one
may be contained in the other, and all these count
as cases of connection. Beginning with connection (C)
as the primitive relation, other relations between one
region (R1) and a second (R2) can be defined as follows:
Relation Symbol Meaning
R1 is disconnected DC R1 and R2
from R2 are not connected.
R1 is part of R2 P Every region
connected to R1 is
connected to R2.
R1 overlaps R2 O Some region is part
of both R1 and R2
R1 is discrete DR R1 does not
from R2 overlap R2
R1 is externally EC R1 and R2
connected to R2 are connected but
do not overlap
R1 partially PO R1 overlaps R2 but
overlaps R2 neither is part of
the other
R1 is equal to R2 EQ Each of R1 and R2
is part of the other
R1 is a proper PP R1 is part of R2 but
part of R2 not equal to it
R1 is a tangential TPP R1 is a proper part
proper part of R2 of R2 and some
region is EC to both.
R1 is a non- NTPP R1 is a proper part
tangential proper of R2 but not a TPP
part of R2
7Beware of a confusion here with the normal mathematical use
of the term ‘connected’ to refer to a region which cannot be
expressed as the union of two disjoint non-empty sets that are
open in the region’s subspace topology, and the related (but not
equivalent) definition of a ‘path-connected’ region as one within
which any two points can be joined by a continuous path lying
wholly within it. To avoid overloading the term in this way, some
authors prefer to use the term ‘contact’ to refer to the binary
relation discussed here. This is sensible, but has not been widely
adopted.
Some of these relations are symmetric, i.e., if the
relation holds between R1 and R2 then it automatically
holds between R2 and R1 as well (in other words, the
relation holds of the two regions without reference to
the order in which they are considered): these are C,
DC, DR, O, PO, EC, and EQ. The remaining relations,
namely P, PP, TPP, and NTPP, are not symmetric, so
they can hold between two regions taken in one order
without holding between the same two regions taken
in the opposite order;8 each of these non-symmetric
relations has an inverse, represented as PI, PPI, TPPI,
NTPPI, such that if R1 and R2 are PP, then R2 and R1
are PPI, and so on. Amongst these 15 relations, eight
are singled out as forming a JEPD set analogous to
the 13 relations of the Interval Calculus, namely DC,
EC, PO, EQ, RPP, NTPP, TPPI, and NTPPI. These
form the system RCC8, and Fig. 4 shows the well-
known Conceptual Neighbourhood Diagram for these
relations.
As with the Interval Calculus, a composition table
can be made for the RCC8 relations, which can be
used as a basis for qualitative reasoning about location.
An example is that if R1 is externally connected to
a non-tangential proper part of R2 then the relation
between the two regions must be either partial overlap
or proper part (either tangential or non-tangential).
This is illustrated in Fig. 5.
As with the Interval Calculus, considerable efforts
have been expended in investigation of the mathemat-
ical and computational properties of RCC. Bennett
(1994) showed that, like the Interval Calculus, RCC is
decidable, but again, as with the Interval Calculus, the
decision problem is known to be NP-complete (Renz
and Nebel 1999). Renz and Nebel (1999) identified a
maximal tractable fragment of RCC-8, and this was
extended to a complete analysis of tractability in Renz
(2002). For spatio-temporal reasoning (Wolter and
Zakharyaschev 2000) established some partial com-
plexity results for a combination of RCC-8 with a cer-
tain discrete point-based temporal logic.
The qualitative spatial properties expressed by
RCC combine mereology (the study of the part-whole
relation) with topology (the study of the connection
relation). Accordingly, this approach to spatial repre-
sentation and reasoning goes under the name of
mereotopology. Inspired by RCC, numerous other
systems of qualitative spatial relations have been in-
troduced, handling more specialised aspects such as
direction and orientation (Freksa 1992b; Frank 1992,
8In fact PP, TPP, and NTPP are asymmetric, meaning that if
any of them holds between R1 and R2, say, then it cannot hold
between R2 and R1.
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Fig. 4 The RCC8 system of
qualitative spatial relations,
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1996), distance (Hernández et al. 1995), shape (Cohn
1995; Schlieder 1996), modes of overlap (Galton 1998),
occlusion (Galton 1994; Randell et al. 2001), and di-
mensionality (Galton 1996). It is probably fair to say
that none of these systems has achieved anything like
the definitive status of RCC within the KR community.
As already noted, within GIScience, the work of
Egenhofer and his collaborators (Egenhofer 1989,
1991; Egenhofer and Franzosa 1991) is more familiar
than RCC. The parallels with RCC extend to a duplica-
tion, in Egenhofer’s own formalism, of the conceptual
neighbourhood graph for RCC-8 (Egenhofer and Al-
Taha 1992). Egenhofer’s approach is entirely different
from RCC, although the goal, to characterise the possi-
ble mereotopological relations amongst spatial regions,
is essentially the same.
In his first formulation (Egenhofer 1989), Egenhofer
considered each region as characterised by its interior






Fig. 5 Composition of RCC relations: If R1 is EC to X and X
is NTPP to R2, then R1 (the dashed circle) must be one of (1)
NTPP, (2) TPP, or (3) PO to R2
tion between two regions by means of a 2×2 matrix,
called the 4-intersection, indicating the emptiness or
otherwise of the intersection between the interior (int)
and boundary (bdy) of one with both the interior and











Here a, b , c, d are 0 or 1 depending on whether or not
the corresponding intersection is empty. For regions
of co-dimension zero, eight of the 16 possible matrices
correspond exactly to the RCC-8 relations, so long as
both regions are assumed to consist of a single con-
nected component (see Fig. 6), and the other eight
cannot occur; but the scheme can be applied equally to
regions of higher co-dimension, so that, for example,
for relationships between regions of co-dimension 1
(e.g., lines in the plane), all 16 matrices correspond to
possible relationships.
In a subsequent formulation (Egenhofer 1991),
Egenhofer considered the exterior (ext) of each region
in addition to its interior and boundary, leading to the
9-intersection matrix, which allows finer discriminations
amongst the relations involving regions with higher co-
dimension. ‘Exterior’ here simply means all of the space

























Fig. 6 Correspondence between RCC-8 and 4-intersection
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under consideration that is not covered by the interior
and boundary; note that for regions of positive co-
dimension, the boundary and interior, in Egenhofer’s
sense, can only be understood as the topological bound-
ary and interior with respect to some subspace topology
having the same dimensionality as the region, whereas
the exterior is the topological exterior with respect to
the space as a whole. In later work, Egenhofer has
gone on to consider relations between, amongst others,
regions in discrete space (Egenhofer and Sharma 1993),
regions with holes (Egenhofer et al. 1994), regions
on the surface of a sphere (Egenhofer 2005), directed
line segments (Kurata and Egenhofer 2006), and also
more discriminating versions of 4-intersection obtained
by including more information about the intersections
(Egenhofer and Franzosa 1995).
Perhaps the most significant difference between
RCC and the Egenhofer systems is that the latter,
but not the former, readily accommodates regions of
positive co-dimension, allowing the expression of rela-
tions between solids, surfaces, edges, and points, which
cannot be handled simultaneously in RCC. This is im-
portant in geographical applications, for example to
express the relationship between a linear region L and
an area A. To see how this works, consider the three
cases shown in Fig. 7. The boundary of the linear region
is considered to consist of its two endpoints. The 9-




























bdy(L) 0    1    1
int(L) 1    1    1
ext(L) 1    1    1
bdy(L) 1    0    0
int(L) 0    0    1
ext(L) 1    1    1
bdy(L) 1    0    1
int(L) 0    0    1
ext(L) 1    1    1
showing that this scheme is able to discriminate these
qualitatively distinct configurations.
Another important difference is that Egenhofer’s
methods can be applied with equal ease to discrete
spaces (e.g., the pixels of a computer display), whereas
in RCC the definition of ‘part’ (namely, that X is part
of Y if and only if everything connected to X is also
Fig. 7 Three relationships between a line and an area
connected to Y) leads to bizarre and counterintuitive
consequences when applied in discrete space.9
Moving beyond RCC and the Egenhofer schemes,
perhaps the most important of the additional qualita-
tive spatial relations mentioned above, in the geograph-
ical context, are distance and direction. Qualitative
distance is expressed using terms such as ‘near’ and
‘far’; qualitative direction using ‘left’, ‘right’, ‘ahead’,
and ‘behind’, and ‘north’, ‘south’, ‘east’, and ‘west’.
A number of different formal schemes for handling
relations of this sort have been proposed. We illustrate
three such schemes for direction in Fig. 8. The conical
and projective schemes are discussed by Frank (1992,
1996), while the double-cross scheme is due to Freksa
(1992b). Both the conical and projective schemes have
eight cardinal directions, or nine if one counts the cen-
tre. The central shaded square in the projective scheme,
which Frank describes as a ‘neutral’ area (“here”),
could be used to represent points sufficiently near to
the reference point not to be assigned a cardinal direc-
tion (in keeping with Frank’s observation that cardinal
directions are ‘almost exclusively used in large-scale
space’). The double-cross scheme relates the position of
a point to a directed line segment which may be thought
of as joining a point of observation to a reference point.
The labels attached to them in Fig. 8c correspond to
those used by Scivos and Nebel (2001), who investi-
gate the computational properties of reasoning in the
double-cross calculus.
For any of these schemes, unrestricted composition
quickly leads to loss of information. For example, if
A is north of B and B is south-east of C, then in
the conical scheme A could be north, north-east, east,
or south-east of C, while in the projective scheme it
could be south of C as well. Frank (1996) presents
instead composition tables derived using a somewhat
mysterious ‘averaging rule’ which results in each entry
of the table consisting of a single relation, though this is
in many cases qualified as ‘approximate’.
Combining space and time
Although, as noted, KR came to grips with the formal
treatment of time before that of space, in GIScience,
the development has, for obvious enough reasons, been
the other way round. Space being the primary domain
here—since a geographical phenomenon is necessar-
ily spatial—the early development of GIS naturally
9Specifically: any region all of whose pixels are adjacent to pixels
outside the region would be part of its complement.
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concentrated on ways of handling space and spatial
relationshiops without reference to the temporal di-
mension. As a result, GIS evolved into a highly sophis-
ticated medium for representing and, to some extent,
reasoning about the spatial relationships amongst ge-
ographical entities existing at one moment in history.
This is, in effect, a snapshot of the world, although it
is natural to assume that the spatial properties under
consideration are sufficiently durable that the ‘snap-
shot’ can be considered to remain valid over a long
enough period to be useful without having to be con-
tinuously updated. Many geographical facts do indeed
have the required durability: on the whole, the bound-
aries of countries and other political and administrative
units remain stable over periods of years (many years
in many cases), as do most geographical features—
both natural (e.g., lakes, rivers, mountains, coasts) and
man-made (e.g., roads, railways, buildings, towns): the
admittedly conspicuous exceptions (e.g., the dramatic
changes in political boundaries in eastern Europe after
the end of the Cold War, areas of relatively rapid
coastal erosion) only serve to highlight the relative
stability of the rest. Without such stability, a ‘snapshot’
of the world at one time would be of limited use beyond
that time—as is easily seen by considering, as a bizarre
thought experiment, the idea of a map which purported
to give the location of every human and every car.
In reality, one is almost never presented with a truly
instantaneous snapshot, since the collection of data
must happen over an extended temporal period. Still,
it is not unreasonable to publish a map purporting to
give, say, the layout of streets and important build-
ings in a particular town as they were at the time
of publication, even though we know there are likely
to be some inaccuracies arising, not from inaccurate
surveying, but from changes that occur between the
time that a particular data item was recorded and the
time that the map was published. As an idealisation,
then, we may take the idea of a snapshot view as being
the paradigm of atemporal GIS, that is, GIS in which
the time-dimension is entirely suppressed.
From here the natural first step in the incorporation
of time into GIS is to consider a time-indexed sequence
of snapshots. This is identified as the Stage I in the ‘brief
history of time in GIS’ presented by Worboys (2005).
But as Worboys pointed out, a sequence of snapshots
does not hold any explicit information about change in
objects or about processes and events.10 Worboys des-
ignates the introduction of explicit reference to change
as Stage II in his brief history, while Stage III brings in
a ‘full-blooded treatment of change, in terms of events
and actions’.
The need for GIScience to handle processes, events
and other temporal phenomena has been highlighted
by many authors in recent years (Peuquet 1994;
Claramunt and Thériault 1995; Yuan 2001; Worboys
2005), but despite these repeated calls to action, and
many individual successes, it remains true that GI-
Science has not yet evolved a stable, agreed set of
conceptual and formal tools for this comparable to
what has been available for many years as regards the
purely spatial part of the enterprise. Within the KR
community, as we have seen, there has been much work
devoted to the development of good formalisms for
space, time, motion, change, etc., and it is natural to
ask whether it is from this work that GIScience will
eventually acquire the much-needed formal and com-
putational tools to enable it to handle temporal phe-
nomena with the ease and fluency already manifested in
its handling of the purely spatial. That this may be so is
10It may of course contain implicit information, simply because
if a particular spatial property holds in one snapshot but not in
the next later one, then it follows that a change with respect to
that property must have occurred in the interval between the two
snapshots—but regarding the nature of that change, e.g., whether
it was a sudden event occurring effectively instantaneously, or a
more drawn-out gradual process going on throughout the inter-
val, the succession of snapshots remains silent.
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suggested by the increasing interest taken in GIScience
by practitioners of KR and related disciplines over
the past 20 years or so (as witness, for example, the
attendance of many such practitioners at conference
series such as COSIT and GIScience).
The remainder of this section will concentrate on a
number of specific themes which involve both time and
space and are of importance to GIScience: continuity,
causality, and identity.
Continuity is a fundamental organising principle for
spatial and temporal data. Because most effects dimin-
ish with distance (in space or time), there is a general
tendency for nearby locations to be more similar to
one another than more distant locations. This is the
phenomenon of autocorrelation, which forms the ba-
sis of most techniques for spatial and temporal inter-
polation.11 For real-valued variables, this leads to a
presumption of continuity in the strict mathematical
sense, and this presumption underlies most widely-
used methods of interpolation. Interpolation is a form
of non-monotonic reasoning: that is, reasoning that
leads to conclusions regarded as plausible but not logi-
cally guaranteed, and hence vulnerable to falsification
after further data acquisition (Antoniou 1997). Non-
monotonic reasoning has been the subject of intensive
study in the KR community, with the aim of devising
extensions to or replacements for standard logics to
emulate the plausible reasoning of everyday life. The
case of temporal non-monotonic reasoning (Sandewall
and Shoham 1995; Shanahan 1997) has received partic-
ular emphasis, key notions here being various forms of
change minimisation: e.g., persistence, the principle that,
in the absence of any reason to infer that a change has
taken place, it can be assumed by default that nothing
has changed; and more generally, the selection of that
inference which minimises the amount of unexplained
change, in effect maximising temporal autocorrelation.
Where, as in these cases, the variable to be interpo-
lated has a discrete value range (e.g., truth values for
propositions in non-monotonic logics), there can be no
continuity in the mathematical sense; autocorrelation in
effect takes the place of strict continuity here. Some-
thing similar is seen in the conceptual neighbourhood
diagrams for systems of relations such as RCC; under
continuous motion or deformation, the RCC relation
11A famous expression of this is Tobler’s First Law of Geogra-
phy: “Everything is related to everything else, but near things
are more related than distant things” (Tobler 1970). Note that,
strictly speaking, the term ‘autocorrelation’ refers to a measure
of the extent to which closer things tend to be more similar
than more distant things; as used in this paragraph, it is to be
understood to mean positive autocorrelation.
between two regions will trace a path in the concep-
tual neighbourhood diagram. Regarding neighbouring
relations as ‘close’, this is simply a form of temporal
autocorrelation. The autocorrelation found in a dis-
crete variable may reflect continuity in some underlying
continuous variables on which the discrete variable
depends; for example, the discrete, qualitative RCC-8
relations depend on the continuous, quantitative char-
acteristics of the regions, and the conceptual neigh-
bourhood diagram for RCC-8 can be derived from a
quantitative description of the space of possible regions
by means of a precisely definable homomorphic map-
ping (Galton 2001). Depending on which continuous
variables are chosen, different conceptual neighbour-
hood relations may be obtained for the discrete values
(Freksa 1992a; Davis 2001).
Temporal interpolation can be used to fill in the
gaps between observations at different times, but for
extrapolating into the future or explaining the present
in terms of the past we need something more pow-
erful: a causal model of the processes giving rise to
change. Causality has been an important theme in
KR, and is intimately bound up with the problems of
non-monotonic temporal reasoning. In the AI context,
causality has been studied as a component of theories
of action, where an agent needs to reason about the
effects of its actions on the world, as well as those of
other agents, both in order to predict what will happen
and to formulate plans of action. An early formalism,
which has had a far-reaching influence on subsequent
developments is AI and KR, is the Situation Calculus
(McCarthy and Hayes 1969); at the core of the formal-
ism is the representation of an action-type as, in effect,
a mapping from situations to situations, providing the
basis both for determining the result of performing a
given sequence of actions starting from a given situation
(prediction) and for inferring an appropriate sequence
of actions to obtain a desired state of affairs starting
from a given situation (planning). A separate strand
of development owes its origin to another highly in-
fluential paper (Kuipers 1984) which used ‘qualitative
differential equations’ as the basis for a system for pre-
dicting the qualitative behaviour of mechanisms char-
acterised by continuous time-varying parameters. The
behaviours can be visualised as tracking a path through
an ‘envisionment’ network which is reminiscent of the
Conceptual Neighbourhood Diagrams for qualitative
relation spaces; this connection is explored further in
Galton (2001).
A third important theme is identity. Problems
concerning identity naturally arise as a result of the
increasing adoption of object-oriented approaches to
data-modelling in GIS (Egenhofer and Frank 1992;
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Worboys 1994). An object’s identity is whatever it is
that can be said to persist through all the changes that
the object can undergo; this need not be anything ma-
terial, but perhaps an enduring pattern of organisation
or activity, or maybe simply a label. But some changes
in the world can affect the identities of the objects it
contains: objects can come into or go out of existence,
and for some types of objects transformations such as
merging or splitting can occur; for yet other objects,
reincarnation may be possible, that is resumption of
existence after temporary suspension (as when, say, a
committee is disbanded and subsequently reinstated)
(Medak 2001). Changes of this kind have been sys-
tematised under the rubric of ‘identity-based change’
(Hornsby and Egenhofer 1998, 2000). While this work
has mainly concentrated on man-made geographical
entities such as countries and other political or admin-
istrative units, some of the ideas can also be applied to
natural objects, for which problems of identity can be
particularly acute: consider for example the case of a
lake which becomes two separate lakes as a result of
a lowering of the water-table; if the water-table subse-
quently rises again and the lakes merge to become one,
should we say that this is the original lake reincarnated
or a new lake occupying the same position? Nature
itself provides no answer to this, but it is a question
which has to be answered for the purposes of recording
the facts about the lake(s) in any information system
which recognises a lake as a specific type of entity.
All this is of course closely connected to the topic of
ontology, mentioned earlier.
Conclusions
In this article I have concentrated on techniques for
representing spatial and temporal knowledge within
the KR subfield of AI and, to a lesser extent, within
GIScience. In the space available it has not been pos-
sible to do more than give a brief overview of some
of the main contributions to this developing enterprise.
The emphasis has been on those systems which have
addressed the most general conceptual issues relating
to space and time; particular applications will always,
of course, have to go beyond this, with domain-specific
knowledge encoded alongside, or rather on top of, the
general framework provided by the spatio-temporal
theory. Being in this way general-purpose systems, such
spatio-temporal theories are prime candidates for im-
plementation within information systems in the drive
to enable them to represent bodies of knowledge, and
not just information.
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